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導語：

近日，美國總統(tǒng)特朗普反復(fù)揚言要“得到”格陵蘭島——1月20日，他在社交媒體上發(fā)布了一張圖片：他手持美國國旗站在格陵蘭島上，旁邊指示牌上寫著“格陵蘭島2026年成為美國領(lǐng)土”。在同日的白宮記者會上，當被追問“到底會為取得格陵蘭島做到什么地步”時，特朗普以“你們很快就會知道”作答。特朗普還表示，他的目標“絕不會改變”，并拒絕排除以武力奪取格陵蘭島的可能性。

格陵蘭島戰(zhàn)略價值集中體現(xiàn)在全球航道、關(guān)鍵資源與未來規(guī)則塑造三方面。美國若執(zhí)意“霸占”格陵蘭島，不僅可能打破北極長期的“低軍事化、低對抗”狀態(tài)，也將侵蝕以協(xié)商為基礎(chǔ)的北極治理傳統(tǒng)。

近日，CGTN官網(wǎng)發(fā)布了IPP副研究員李品保博士的評論文章。文章指出，北極正從科學合作與環(huán)境保護的典范，演變?yōu)榈鼐壵螌沟慕裹c。從對格陵蘭島的不懈圖謀到區(qū)域軍事化部署，美國近期在北極戰(zhàn)略上的步步緊逼，暴露出其從多邊合作轉(zhuǎn)向單邊主導的危險傾向，使北極越來越不像共同治理的空間，而更像是待攫取的“戰(zhàn)利品”。他強調(diào)，這種以“國家安全”為名的施壓將撕裂多邊治理機制、助長安全困境，并破壞基于規(guī)則的秩序。

特朗普1月20日凌晨在社交媒體上發(fā)布圖片，他手拿美國國旗登上格陵蘭島，身后站著美國副總統(tǒng)萬斯和國務(wù)卿魯比奧。圖源：Truth Social

本文作者

李品保

IPP副研究員

北極，這個曾經(jīng)象征科學合作與環(huán)境保護的典范，如今正演變?yōu)榈鼐壵螌沟慕裹c。美國近期在北極戰(zhàn)略上的步步緊逼——從對格陵蘭島的不懈圖謀到區(qū)域軍事化部署——暴露出其從多邊合作轉(zhuǎn)向單邊主導的危險傾向。這種根植于單邊行動和霸權(quán)邏輯的路徑，不僅威脅北極穩(wěn)定，也危及全球秩序的根基。

在戰(zhàn)略定位上，美國已將北極視為大國競爭的關(guān)鍵地緣舞臺。其《北極地區(qū)國家戰(zhàn)略》（2022）及《2024年國防部北極戰(zhàn)略》均將“安全”與“戰(zhàn)略競爭”置于優(yōu)先位置，并明確將俄羅斯和中國標注為競爭對手。這清晰表明，美國看待北極的視角已從“需要多邊協(xié)作應(yīng)對共同挑戰(zhàn)的區(qū)域”轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)椤熬S系全球霸權(quán)的戰(zhàn)略支點”。

美國政府的行動早已超越言論層面。2025年美國副總統(tǒng)J.D.萬斯未經(jīng)邀請突訪位于格陵蘭島的美軍基地，配合特朗普總統(tǒng)“不惜動用武力”奪島的威脅言論，昭示著其刻意繞開丹麥主權(quán)的戰(zhàn)略意圖。

2025年3月28日，美國副總統(tǒng)萬斯（左一）率代表團訪問位于格陵蘭島北部的美國皮圖菲克太空基地。圖源：AP

同時，美國借助《紅白藍地法案》（Red, White, and Blueland Act of 2025）規(guī)避常規(guī)外交渠道，直接投資格陵蘭關(guān)鍵礦產(chǎn)項目，并部署F-35戰(zhàn)機群至該區(qū)域，所有這些都被冠以“國家安全需要”之名。這種多維施壓詮釋了美國的戰(zhàn)略轉(zhuǎn)向：北極越來越不像共同治理的空間，而更像是待攫取的“戰(zhàn)利品”。

此類行徑折射出“美國優(yōu)先”思維驅(qū)動的強權(quán)政治邏輯，與國際社會期待的合作精神背道而馳。其危害體現(xiàn)在以下四個關(guān)鍵方面：

第一，撕裂多邊治理機制。北極理事會作為該地區(qū)氣候、生態(tài)與原住民事務(wù)的核心治理平臺，正在美國施壓下分崩離析。通過脅迫北約盟友配合其議程，并以“安全”為由排擠非北約成員，美國加速了理事會的癱瘓進程。俄羅斯和芬蘭相繼退出巴倫支歐洲-北極理事會，進一步印證了地緣政治競爭正在削弱重要的區(qū)域合作框架。失去這些合作平臺，針對北極變暖等議題的協(xié)同應(yīng)對，以及對脆弱社區(qū)的支援都將陷入停滯。

第二，助長危險的安全困境與軍備競賽。美國正將格陵蘭島上的皮圖菲克太空基地快速改造為一個永久性進攻樞紐。這種單邊安全追求加劇了區(qū)域軍事對抗，迫使各方重新評估其安全邊界，引發(fā)緊張局勢螺旋式升級。其惡果是，北極正面臨淪為核沖突引爆點的風險。在這種高風險的環(huán)境中，哪怕出現(xiàn)一次誤判，都可能引發(fā)超出北極圈范圍的危機。

當?shù)貢r間19日，北美防空司令部（NORAD）在社交媒體上表示，北美防空司令部的飛機將很快抵達位于格陵蘭的美國皮圖菲克太空基地。

第三，破壞國際法與基于規(guī)則的秩序。美國通過政治和軍事壓力挑戰(zhàn)丹麥對格陵蘭主權(quán)的完整性，同時卻在“航行自由”和總體“國家安全”的旗號下，為其自身在北極的軍事擴張辯護。這種對原則的選擇性適用形成了雙重標準——盡管中國在格陵蘭礦產(chǎn)領(lǐng)域的投資純屬商業(yè)行為，美國仍以“安全威脅”為由加以阻撓。這種對合法經(jīng)濟活動的“安全化”操作，侵蝕了全球治理體系的信任基礎(chǔ)，將北極變成強權(quán)規(guī)則的角力場，而非共同規(guī)范治理的空間。

第四，動搖全球秩序穩(wěn)定。美國通過向北約盟友丹麥施壓來試探同盟體系的邊界，暴露出跨大西洋聯(lián)盟信任關(guān)系的脆弱一面。連鎖效應(yīng)已然顯現(xiàn)，北極利益攸關(guān)方各有反應(yīng)：德國、法國等歐洲北約成員國以應(yīng)對區(qū)域威脅為由啟動對格陵蘭的偵察行動，其他北極及近北極國家則被迫在大國競爭升級背景下重新評估其安全與合作框架。當美國將“美國優(yōu)先”置于共同安全之上時，世界正被推回冷戰(zhàn)時期的零和思維。

關(guān)鍵在于，美國的北極戰(zhàn)略本身就存在缺陷。將北極視為待爭奪的“戰(zhàn)利品”，使得美國有時忽視了一個現(xiàn)實：北極變暖正是更廣泛的氣候變化趨勢的重要推動力量之一，直接威脅著全球糧食安全、氣象模式與沿海城市。美國聲稱要維護“穩(wěn)定”，但其行動卻在制造所要防止的動蕩。

中國作為近北極國家和負責任大國，始終倡導構(gòu)建基于規(guī)則的北極治理。通過“冰上絲綢之路”、聯(lián)合科考及對北極理事會的支持，中國證明可持續(xù)發(fā)展之路在于合作而非對抗。相比之下，美國戰(zhàn)略則是過時世界觀的產(chǎn)物，終將事與愿違。

圖為在摩爾曼斯克建造的混凝土重力式平臺，它將承載中俄合作的“北極2”液化工廠。圖源：新華社

北極不是大國博弈的棋盤。它是人類共同遺產(chǎn)，是原住民家園，是地球氣候調(diào)節(jié)器，也是全球貿(mào)易通道。美國選擇將其軍事化并排擠他國，絕非實力的體現(xiàn)，而是讓世界更加分裂、更不安全、更難應(yīng)對氣候危機的戰(zhàn)略誤判。

因此，國際社會必須摒棄美國的單邊行徑。主權(quán)原則、多邊主義和國際法應(yīng)當?shù)玫骄S護——這正是北極治理數(shù)十年的基石。唯有通過包容性對話，我們才能確保北極的未來是和平之地而非戰(zhàn)爭舞臺。

中國秉持以國際法為根基、以科學合作為紐帶、以主權(quán)尊重為準則的立場，為北極參與提供了建設(shè)性方案。隨著北極加速變暖，世界絕不能任由大國競爭凌駕于集體行動之上。前行之路需要克制、透明，更需要回歸指導北極治理的核心原則：合作而非對抗，規(guī)則而非武力。

在北極領(lǐng)域，中國通過參與北極理事會有關(guān)工作，舉辦中國—北歐北極合作研討會、開展北冰洋科學考察等，積極向國際社會提供對話合作平臺、分享科研成果。圖源：新華社

*以下為英文原文，供讀者對照參考（請上下滑動查看）。

The Arctic, once a beacon of scientific collaboration and environmental stewardship, is now becoming a flashpoint of geopolitical confrontation. The United States' recent escalation in its Arctic strategy – evidenced by its relentless pursuit of Greenland and militarization of the region – reveals a dangerous shift from multilateral cooperation to unilateral dominance. This approach, rooted in one-sided actions and hegemonic logic, threatens not only Arctic stability but the very foundations of the global order.

In terms of strategic positioning, the U.S. now views the Arctic as a critical geopolitical arena for great-power competition. Its National Strategy for the Arctic Region (2022) and the 2024 Department of Defense Arctic Strategy prioritize "security" and "strategic competition," explicitly labeling Russia and China as competitors. This clearly demonstrates that the U.S. perceives the Arctic primarily through the lens of maintaining global hegemony rather than as an area requiring multilateral cooperation to address shared challenges.

The U.S. government's actions have moved beyond rhetoric. In 2025, U.S. Vice President JD Vance's uninvited visit to Greenland's U.S. military base, coupled with President Donald Trump's threat to "use military force" to seize the territory, signaled a deliberate strategy to bypass Danish sovereignty.

At the same time, the U.S. leveraged the Red, White, and Blueland Act to bypass diplomatic channels and invested in Greenland's critical mineral projects. It also deployed F-35 fighters to the region, framing all of this as a "national security imperative." This multifaceted pressure campaign epitomizes a strategic shift: the Arctic appears less as a zone for shared governance and more as a prize to be claimed. These actions reflect a power-politics logic driven by an "America First" mindset, which contradicts the cooperative spirit expected by the international community.

The harm of this approach manifests in four critical dimensions:

Firstly, it fractures multilateral governance. The Arctic Council, the region's primary platform for climate, ecology and indigenous affairs, is collapsing under U.S. pressure. By pressuring NATO allies to align with its agenda and emphasizing "security" to exclude non-NATO actors, the U.S. has accelerated the Council's paralysis. The subsequent withdrawals of Russia and Finland from the Barents Euro-Arctic Council exemplify how geopolitical rivalry is crippling crucial regional cooperation frameworks. Without these platforms, coordinated efforts on issues like Arctic warming – which accelerates global sea-level rise – and support for vulnerable communities stall.

Secondly, it fuels a dangerous security dilemma and arms race. The U.S. is rapidly transforming Greenland's Pituffik Space Base into a permanent offensive hub. This pursuit of unilateral security has dramatically intensified military confrontation in the region, compelling all parties to reassess their security boundaries and triggering a spiral of tension. The result is that the Arctic now risks becoming a nuclear flashpoint. A single miscalculation in this high-stakes environment could trigger a crisis far beyond the polar circle.

Thirdly, it undermines international law and the rule-based order. The U.S. challenges the integrity of Danish sovereignty over Greenland through political and military pressure, while simultaneously justifying its own expanded military activities in the Arctic under the banner of "freedom of navigation" and overarching "national security." This selective application of principles creates a double standard, evident in its efforts to block Chinese investments in Greenland's mineral sector by labeling them "security threats," despite their commercial nature. Such instrumental "securitization" of lawful economic activity erodes trust in global governance, turning the Arctic into a battleground for arbitrary rules rather than a space governed by consistent and shared norms.

Fourthly, it destabilizes the global order. The U.S. is testing the limits of its alliance system by pressuring Denmark – a NATO partner – over sovereignty. This exposes the fragility of transatlantic trust. The ripple effects are already visible, prompting various reactions from Arctic stakeholders: European NATO members like Germany and France have initiated reconnaissance missions to Greenland, framing them as necessary responses to regional threats, while other Arctic and near-Arctic nations are compelled to reassess their security and cooperation frameworks in the face of escalating great-power competition. As the U.S. prioritizes "America First" over shared security, it risks turning the world back to a Cold War-era zero-sum mentality.

Critically, the U.S. strategy fails on its own terms. By treating the Arctic as a prize to be won, the U.S. sometimes overlooks the reality that Arctic warming is a major driver of broader climate change trends, which consequently poses a direct threat to global food security, weather patterns and coastal cities worldwide. The U.S. claims to champion "stability," yet its actions are generating the very instability it purports to prevent.

China, as a near-Arctic state and responsible global actor, has consistently advocated for a rules-based Arctic. China's engagement – through the Ice Silk Road, joint scientific expeditions and support for the Arctic Council – demonstrates that cooperation, not confrontation, is the path to sustainable development. The U.S. strategy, by contrast, is a self-defeating relic of an outdated worldview.

The Arctic is not a chessboard for great-power competition. It is a shared heritage, home to indigenous communities, a climate regulator for the planet, and a corridor for global trade. The U.S. choice to militarize it and exclude others is not strength – it is a strategic miscalculation that will leave the world more divided, less secure and less capable of addressing the climate crisis that binds us all.

Therefore, the global community must reject the U.S. single-edged approach. The principles of sovereignty, multilateralism and international law should be upheld, as they have underpinned Arctic governance for decades. Only through inclusive dialogue – not unilateral coercion – can we secure the Arctic's future as a zone of peace, not a theater of war.

China's position – rooted in international law, scientific cooperation and respect for sovereignty – offers a blueprint for engagement. As the Arctic warms, the world cannot afford to let great-power competition override the imperative of collective action. The path forward requires restraint, transparency and a return to the principles that have governed the Arctic for decades: cooperation, not confrontation; rules, not force.

文章于2026年1月19日刊登于CGTN官網(wǎng)，點擊圖片鏈接閱讀原文。圖源：CGTN網(wǎng)站截圖

李品保 華南理工大學公共政策研究院 副研究員

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華南理工大學公共政策研究院（IPP）是一個獨立、非營利性的知識創(chuàng)新與公共政策研究平臺。IPP圍繞中國的體制改革、社會政策、中國話語權(quán)與國際關(guān)系等開展一系列的研究工作，并在此基礎(chǔ)上形成知識創(chuàng)新和政策咨詢協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展的良好格局。IPP的愿景是打造開放式的知識創(chuàng)新和政策研究平臺，成為領(lǐng)先世界的中國智庫。