IPP評(píng)論是國(guó)家高端智庫(kù)華南理工大學(xué)公共政策研究院（IPP）官方微信平臺(tái)。

導(dǎo)語(yǔ)：自2月28日美以聯(lián)軍對(duì)伊朗發(fā)動(dòng)代號(hào)“史詩(shī)之怒”的軍事行動(dòng)以來(lái)，伊朗戰(zhàn)事影響不斷外溢，大國(guó)在應(yīng)對(duì)危機(jī)時(shí)的戰(zhàn)略考量備受關(guān)注。與此同時(shí)，英國(guó)、法國(guó)、德國(guó)等傳統(tǒng)歐洲主要國(guó)家，以及印度、土耳其等全球中等強(qiáng)國(guó)的反應(yīng)，可能正反映出更深層次的國(guó)際秩序調(diào)整。

IPP榮譽(yù)教授梅里·馬達(dá)沙希（Mehri Madarshahi）指出，伊朗戰(zhàn)事暴露出“大國(guó)聯(lián)盟”模式的固有局限，同時(shí)彰顯出戰(zhàn)略自主性在當(dāng)今國(guó)際體系中日益重要的地位。以“全球南方”國(guó)家為代表，包括印度、巴西、印尼、沙特和土耳其等具備獨(dú)立外交能動(dòng)性的行為體，或?qū)⒅鸩矫撾x對(duì)特定大國(guó)集團(tuán)的依附，轉(zhuǎn)而通過(guò)戰(zhàn)略對(duì)沖與多邊協(xié)作謀求自身利益最大化。這一趨勢(shì)表明，國(guó)際體系并未朝向穩(wěn)定的“三極結(jié)構(gòu)”演進(jìn)。相反，它更可能走向碎片化、多極化。

梅里·馬達(dá)沙希（Mehri Madarshahi）

華南理工大學(xué)公共政策研究院（IPP）榮譽(yù)教授、聯(lián)合國(guó)教科文組織下屬國(guó)際創(chuàng)意和可持續(xù)發(fā)展中心（ICCSD）顧問(wèn)委員會(huì)成員

Honorary Professorof The Institute of Public Policy (IPP) ,South China University of Technology (SCUT) ; Member of the Advisory Committee of the International Center for Creativity and Sustainable Development under the auspicious of UNESO (ICCSD).

正文

The Iran Test:

Strategic Autonomy and the Fracturing of Great-Power Coalitions

伊朗考驗(yàn)：戰(zhàn)略自主與大國(guó)聯(lián)盟的瓦解

新興“三極秩序”的幻象

The Illusion of Emerging Tripolarity

近年來(lái)，國(guó)際輿論越來(lái)越關(guān)注一個(gè)以美國(guó)、中國(guó)和俄羅斯為核心的“三極國(guó)際秩序”的出現(xiàn)。在這一框架下，發(fā)展中國(guó)家——通常統(tǒng)稱為“全球南方”——被普遍預(yù)期會(huì)向這些主要地緣政治極點(diǎn)之一靠攏。

For several years, international debate has increasingly focused on the emergence of a tripolar international order structured around the United States, China, and Russia. Within this framework, much of the developing world, often collectively described as the “Global South”, has been expected to gravitate toward one or another of these major geopolitical poles.

然而，近期圍繞伊朗危機(jī)的發(fā)展表明，這種解讀可能過(guò)于簡(jiǎn)化。與其說(shuō)這一事件印證了對(duì)立地緣政治集團(tuán)的鞏固，不如說(shuō)它凸顯了大國(guó)聯(lián)盟的局限性，同時(shí)揭示了地區(qū)行為體追求戰(zhàn)略自主的重要性日益增強(qiáng)。

Recent developments surrounding the Iran crisis, however, suggest that this interpretation may be overly simplistic. Rather than confirming the consolidation of rival geopolitical blocs, the episode highlights the limits of great-power alignment and reveals the growing importance of strategic autonomy among regional actors.

伊朗的困境

Iran’s dilama

在過(guò)去十年中，伊朗不斷深化與俄羅斯和中國(guó)在政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)及軍事領(lǐng)域的聯(lián)系。這些關(guān)系通常被解讀為更廣泛地緣政治格局的一部分，旨在制衡西方影響力。在能源、防務(wù)和外交等領(lǐng)域的合作不斷擴(kuò)展，似乎顯示出國(guó)際體系中一個(gè)替代性聯(lián)盟正在逐步成型。

Over the past decade, Iran has cultivated closer political, economic, and military ties with both Russia and China. These relationships were often interpreted as part of a broader geopolitical alignment aimed at counterbalancing Western influence. Expanding cooperation in energy, defence, and diplomacy appeared to signal the gradual consolidation of an alternative coalition within the international system.

2025年3月14日，中俄伊北京會(huì)晤成功舉行。中華人民共和國(guó)外交部副部長(zhǎng)馬朝旭、俄羅斯聯(lián)邦外交部副部長(zhǎng)里亞布科夫、伊朗伊斯蘭共和國(guó)外交部副部長(zhǎng)加里布阿巴迪分別與會(huì)。（圖源：央視新聞）

然而，近期危機(jī)暴露出這些安排的固有限制。盡管莫斯科和中國(guó)在外交上的言辭對(duì)伊朗有所“支持”，并對(duì)西方行動(dòng)提出批評(píng)，但兩國(guó)都不愿將對(duì)抗升級(jí)，也未提供直接的戰(zhàn)略支持。即便在言辭上保持一致、合作關(guān)系日益深化，伊朗在這場(chǎng)危機(jī)中最終仍幾乎獨(dú)自應(yīng)對(duì)。

Yet the recent crisis demonstrated the inherent limits of these arrangements. While Moscow and Beijing expressed diplomatic support for Iran and criticized Western actions, neither power appeared willing to escalate the confrontation or provide direct strategic backing. Despite rhetorical alignment and growing partnerships, Iran ultimately faced the crisis largely on its own.

這一結(jié)果凸顯了當(dāng)代地緣政治的一個(gè)重要結(jié)構(gòu)特征：大國(guó)與地區(qū)行為體之間的戰(zhàn)略伙伴關(guān)系，往往缺乏歷史上塑造穩(wěn)定地緣政治集團(tuán)所具有的制度縱深與約束性承諾。俄羅斯的經(jīng)濟(jì)制約、中國(guó)的全球經(jīng)濟(jì)相互依賴性，以及美國(guó)不斷變化的聯(lián)盟模式，都限制了明確界定的地緣政治極點(diǎn)的形成。

This outcome underscores an important structural feature of contemporary geopolitics. Strategic partnerships among major powers and regional actors frequently lack the institutional depth and binding commitments that historically defined stable geopolitical blocs. Russia’s economic constraints, China’s global economic interdependence, and the shifting alliance patterns of the United States have all limited the emergence of clearly defined geopolitical poles.

危機(jī)并未強(qiáng)化集團(tuán)政治，反而揭示了當(dāng)代許多國(guó)際伙伴關(guān)系的交易性特征。大國(guó)可能在“全球南方”各地發(fā)展合作關(guān)系，但一旦面臨大規(guī)模升級(jí)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，其核心戰(zhàn)略利益往往會(huì)凌駕于對(duì)地區(qū)伙伴的承諾之上。

Rather than reinforcing bloc politics, the crisis exposed the transactional nature of many contemporary international partnerships. Major powers may cultivate relationships across the Global South, but when confronted with the risk of large-scale escalation, their core strategic priorities tend to prevail over commitments to regional partners.

全球南方的轉(zhuǎn)型

The Transformation of the Global South

這一事件的影響遠(yuǎn)不止伊朗本身。對(duì)于亞洲、非洲和拉丁美洲的許多國(guó)家來(lái)說(shuō)，這場(chǎng)危機(jī)提供了一個(gè)令人警醒的戰(zhàn)略教訓(xùn)：與大國(guó)建立伙伴關(guān)系，并不必然意味著能夠獲得可靠的安全保障。

The implications of this episode extend far beyond Iran itself. For many countries across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the crisis offers a sobering strategic lesson: partnerships with major powers do not necessarily translate into reliable security guarantees.

歷史上，“全球南方”常被描述為一種政治身份，其形成源于共同的發(fā)展挑戰(zhàn)以及后殖民時(shí)期的團(tuán)結(jié)精神。然而，隨著時(shí)間推移，這一概念不斷演變。如今，這一廣義群體中的許多國(guó)家——如印度、巴西、印度尼西亞、沙特阿拉伯和土耳其——已具備顯著的地緣政治能動(dòng)性，并日益推動(dòng)以戰(zhàn)略自主為基礎(chǔ)的外交政策。

Historically, the Global South was often described as a political identity shaped by shared developmental challenges and post-colonial solidarity. Over time, however, this concept has evolved. Today, many countries within this broad grouping, such as India, Brazil, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye, possess significant geopolitical agency and increasingly pursue foreign policies based on strategic autonomy.

這些國(guó)家并未嚴(yán)格依附于競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性大國(guó)集團(tuán)，而是力圖同時(shí)在多方伙伴之間保持平衡。因此，“全球南方”正從一個(gè)松散界定的政治聯(lián)盟，演變?yōu)橛啥嘣獞?zhàn)略行為體組成的星座體系，每個(gè)國(guó)家都根據(jù)自身國(guó)家利益在國(guó)際體系中自主運(yùn)籌。

Rather than aligning rigidly with competing great-power blocs, many of these states seek to balance relations with multiple partners simultaneously. The Global South is, therefore, evolving from a loosely defined political coalition into a constellation of diverse strategic actors, each navigating the international system according to its own national interests.

伊朗的經(jīng)驗(yàn)進(jìn)一步印證了這一趨勢(shì)。即便是與大國(guó)保持密切戰(zhàn)略關(guān)系的國(guó)家，在危機(jī)時(shí)刻也無(wú)法依賴其直接保護(hù)，其他國(guó)家可能因此得出結(jié)論：依賴遠(yuǎn)方的庇護(hù)國(guó)并不能提供可靠的安全保障。

The Iranian experience reinforces this trend. If even a state that maintains close strategic relations with major powers cannot rely on their direct protection in moments of crisis, other countries may conclude that dependence on distant patrons offers limited security.

這一認(rèn)識(shí)可能促使“全球南方”的各國(guó)政府更加重視多元化伙伴關(guān)系、區(qū)域外交，以及圍繞戰(zhàn)略自主的能力建設(shè)。

This realization could encourage governments across the Global South to place greater emphasis on diversified partnerships, regional diplomacy, and autonomous strategic capabilities.

中等強(qiáng)國(guó)與戰(zhàn)略對(duì)沖

Middle Powers and Strategic Hedging

中等強(qiáng)國(guó)——指那些在地區(qū)具有重要影響力但在全球?qū)用嬗绊懹邢薜膰?guó)家——對(duì)此類發(fā)展尤為敏感。對(duì)于這些國(guó)家而言，伊朗危機(jī)凸顯了過(guò)度依賴遠(yuǎn)方地緣政治庇護(hù)國(guó)所帶來(lái)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

Middle powers states with significant regional influence but limited global reach, are particularly sensitive to these developments. For such countries, the Iran crisis highlights the risks associated with excessive reliance on distant geopolitical patrons.

在日益兩極化的國(guó)際環(huán)境中，許多中等強(qiáng)國(guó)可能不會(huì)選邊站隊(duì)，而是加大戰(zhàn)略對(duì)沖的力度。所謂戰(zhàn)略對(duì)沖，指的是在與多方大國(guó)保持合作關(guān)系的同時(shí)，避免與任何單一大國(guó)形成深度戰(zhàn)略捆綁。

Rather than choosing sides in an increasingly polarized international environment, many middle powers may intensify strategies of strategic hedging. This approach involves maintaining cooperative relations with multiple major powers while avoiding deep strategic entanglements with any single one of them.

加拿大總理卡尼在達(dá)沃斯論壇上呼吁其他“中等強(qiáng)國(guó)”在面對(duì)大國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)“脅迫”時(shí)團(tuán)結(jié)一致。2026年初以來(lái)的外交活動(dòng)中，卡尼在加強(qiáng)與印度、澳大利亞等非超級(jí)大國(guó)的聯(lián)系，并且在國(guó)際講話與訪問(wèn)中提出類似“中等強(qiáng)國(guó)合作”的理念。圖源：AP

在這種背景下，國(guó)際體系的發(fā)展可能不會(huì)朝向僵化的對(duì)抗性集團(tuán)，而更可能呈現(xiàn)出流動(dòng)性更強(qiáng)、去中心化的格局。地區(qū)行為體和中等強(qiáng)國(guó)將在塑造外交格局和戰(zhàn)略結(jié)果中發(fā)揮更加突出的作用。

In this context, the international system may evolve not toward rigid rival blocs but toward a more fluid and decentralized configuration. Regional actors and middle powers could play a more prominent role in shaping diplomatic alignments and strategic outcomes.

這種策略并不意味著中立或消極。恰恰相反，它體現(xiàn)了對(duì)碎片化國(guó)際環(huán)境的務(wù)實(shí)適應(yīng)——在這種環(huán)境中，僵化的聯(lián)盟所能提供的戰(zhàn)略確定性正日益減弱。

Such a strategy does not imply neutrality or passivity. On the contrary, it reflects a pragmatic adaptation to a fragmented international environment in which rigid alliances provide diminishing strategic certainty.

伊朗危機(jī)：?jiǎn)⑹拘园咐?/strong>

The Iran Crisis as a Revealing Case

對(duì)伊朗的攻擊發(fā)生在美國(guó)對(duì)委內(nèi)瑞拉發(fā)動(dòng)突襲僅兩個(gè)月之后。這兩個(gè)國(guó)家均與北京和莫斯科保持著密切關(guān)系，同時(shí)也是中國(guó)的重要能源供應(yīng)國(guó)。

The attack on Iran occurred only two months after a U.S. raid against Venezuela, two governments that have maintained close relations with both Beijing and Moscow and that serve as significant energy suppliers to China.

一些分析人士將這些事件置于更廣泛的大國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)框架下進(jìn)行解讀。根據(jù)哈德遜研究所的觀點(diǎn)，這類打擊不應(yīng)僅被視為孤立的軍事行動(dòng)，而應(yīng)被看作塑造所謂“印太世紀(jì)”新格局的更廣泛戰(zhàn)略博弈的一部分。

Some analysts have interpreted these events within the broader framework of great-power competition. According to the Hudson Institute, such strikes should be viewed not simply as isolated military operations but as part of a broader strategic contest shaping what it describes as the emerging “Indo-Pacific century.”

中國(guó)和俄羅斯的克制回應(yīng)，揭示了所謂新興“三極敘事”的局限性。

The restrained responses of China and Russia illustrate the limits of the emerging tripolar narrative.

中國(guó)

China

秉持既有外交立場(chǎng)，中國(guó)對(duì)美以聯(lián)合打擊行動(dòng)予以譴責(zé)，同時(shí)避免表現(xiàn)出任何直接軍事承諾的跡象。中國(guó)將美以的行動(dòng)定性為對(duì)伊朗主權(quán)及《聯(lián)合國(guó)憲章》原則的侵犯。

Consistent with its established diplomatic posture, China responded to the U.S.-Israeli strikes with strong rhetorical condemnation while avoiding any indication of direct military commitment. Beijing characterized the actions as a violation of Iran’s sovereignty and of the principles of the United Nations Charter. Yet its response remained confined to diplomatic language.

對(duì)于中國(guó)而言，伊朗主要作為能源供應(yīng)國(guó)、外交伙伴及受制裁折扣（sanctions-discounted）影響的經(jīng)濟(jì)市場(chǎng)，而非傳統(tǒng)意義上的正式條約盟友。在這種情況下，為伊朗直接與華盛頓對(duì)抗帶來(lái)的戰(zhàn)略利益十分有限，同時(shí)伴隨著相當(dāng)大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

For China, Iran is primarily valuable as an energy supplier, diplomatic partner, and sanctions-discounted economic market rather than as a formal treaty ally. In such circumstances, direct confrontation with Washington on Iran’s behalf would offer limited strategic benefits while carrying considerable risks.

在短期內(nèi)，中國(guó)傾向于避免陷入戰(zhàn)略困境，同時(shí)保持對(duì)優(yōu)先戰(zhàn)略區(qū)域的關(guān)注，尤其是臺(tái)灣地區(qū)和南海。這一立場(chǎng)使北京能夠譴責(zé)武力使用、捍衛(wèi)主權(quán)原則，同時(shí)將在遠(yuǎn)距離沖突中可能產(chǎn)生的軍事成本降至最低。與此同時(shí)，保持旁觀立場(chǎng)使中國(guó)能夠在不直接介入的情況下，觀察美軍的作戰(zhàn)行動(dòng)及后勤能力。

In the short term, China appears determined to avoid strategic entrapment while preserving its focus on priority theatres, particularly Taiwan and the South China Sea. This posture allows Beijing to condemn the use of force and defend principles of sovereignty while minimizing the costs of military involvement in a distant conflict. At the same time, remaining on the sidelines allows China to observe U.S. military operations and logistical capabilities without direct exposure.

中國(guó)高度依賴中東能源供應(yīng)，其中約45%的石油進(jìn)口需經(jīng)霍爾木茲海峽。由此可見(jiàn)，海灣地區(qū)若出現(xiàn)長(zhǎng)期供應(yīng)中斷，對(duì)中國(guó)確實(shí)也會(huì)造成一定的不利影響。

However, China’s position is not without vulnerability. The country remains highly dependent on Middle Eastern energy supplies, and approximately 45 percent of its oil imports transit the Strait of Hormuz. Any prolonged disruption in the Gulf would therefore carry significant economic consequences for Beijing.

霍爾木茲海峽及其附近區(qū)域在2026年2月28日至3月11日發(fā)生的商船襲擊事件分布（藍(lán)色圓點(diǎn)：油輪；空心圓：其他船舶）。圖源：AFP

更廣泛地看，這一事件也凸顯了中國(guó)對(duì)外戰(zhàn)略的一個(gè)結(jié)構(gòu)性特征：中國(guó)的國(guó)際合作關(guān)系往往以深度經(jīng)濟(jì)嵌入和融合為核心，但在安全承諾上則相對(duì)有限。雖然從中國(guó)自身角度來(lái)看，這一模式可能是理性的；但對(duì)于面臨迫切安全威脅的合作伙伴而言，可能會(huì)希望得到來(lái)自中國(guó)的更多安全保障。

More broadly, the episode highlights a structural feature of China’s external engagement strategy. Beijing’s international partnerships are often characterized by deep economic integration combined with relatively limited security commitments. While this model may appear rational from China’s perspective, it may prove less reassuring to partners confronted with acute security threats.

俄羅斯

Russia

自2022年以來(lái)，伊朗也成為俄羅斯重要的軍事與外交伙伴。然而，俄羅斯與伊朗于2025年1月簽署的全面戰(zhàn)略伙伴關(guān)系條約并未包含共同防御條款。與俄羅斯與白俄羅斯或朝鮮等國(guó)的安排不同，雙方簽訂的條約并未要求進(jìn)行軍事干預(yù)。

Iran has also become an important military and diplomatic partner for Russia since 2022. Nevertheless, the Russia–Iran strategic partnership agreement signed in January 2025 does not include a mutual defence clause. Unlike Russia’s arrangements with states such as Belarus or North Korea, the agreement stops short of obligating military intervention.

在美以對(duì)伊朗發(fā)起打擊時(shí)，克里姆林宮譴責(zé)了這些行動(dòng)，但同時(shí)卻強(qiáng)調(diào)了伊朗并未請(qǐng)求俄羅斯提供軍事援助。這種表述使莫斯科能夠傳達(dá)政治支持，而無(wú)需越過(guò)直接介入的門檻。從短期來(lái)看，俄羅斯可能會(huì)從能源價(jià)格上漲以及西方戰(zhàn)略注意力從烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)上轉(zhuǎn)移中獲得一定的經(jīng)濟(jì)收益。然而，從政治角度來(lái)看，這場(chǎng)危機(jī)可能損害莫斯科作為可靠戰(zhàn)略伙伴的形象。

When the strikes occurred, the Kremlin condemned the attacks but emphasized that Iran had not requested Russian military assistance. This formulation allowed Moscow to signal political support without crossing the threshold into direct involvement. In the short term, Russia may benefit economically from higher energy prices and from any diversion of Western strategic attention away from the war in Ukraine. Politically, however, the crisis risks damaging Moscow’s image as a reliable strategic partner.

即便俄羅斯從未正式承諾提供軍事防護(hù)，但若外界認(rèn)為其無(wú)法或不愿保護(hù)合作伙伴，仍可能造成聲譽(yù)受損。一個(gè)無(wú)法保障伙伴安全的國(guó)家，或許仍能夠讓他國(guó)敬畏，但難以真正贏得信任。

Even if Russia never formally promised military defence, the perception that it was unable or unwilling to protect a close partner may carry reputational costs. A power that cannot shield its partners may still inspire fear, but it inspires less confidence.

伊朗總統(tǒng)馬蘇德·佩澤什基揚(yáng)和俄羅斯總統(tǒng)弗拉基米爾·普京去年在上海會(huì)晤。圖源：塔斯社

美國(guó)

The United States

美國(guó)在委內(nèi)瑞拉和伊朗的行動(dòng)同樣反映了更廣泛的戰(zhàn)略考量。在委內(nèi)瑞拉的突襲行動(dòng)，凸顯了華盛頓仍愿意在其自視為傳統(tǒng)勢(shì)力范圍內(nèi)投射壓倒性的軍事力量。

The U.S. operations in Venezuela and Iran also appear to reflect broader strategic calculations. The raid in Venezuela demonstrated Washington’s willingness to project overwhelming military power within what it still considers its traditional sphere of influence.

與此同時(shí)，該行動(dòng)似乎旨在實(shí)現(xiàn)政治目標(biāo)，例如針對(duì)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層實(shí)施“斬首”行動(dòng)或?qū)φ?quán)施加壓力，同時(shí)避免對(duì)能源基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施造成大規(guī)模破壞。這表明，其戰(zhàn)略意圖是“精確干預(yù)”，而非無(wú)差別的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)行為。

At the same time, the operation appeared designed to achieve political objectives, such as leadership decapitation or regime pressure, without causing large-scale disruption to energy infrastructure. This suggests a strategy of calibrated intervention rather than indiscriminate warfare.

當(dāng)?shù)貢r(shí)間3月5日，美國(guó)國(guó)務(wù)院宣布，美國(guó)和委內(nèi)瑞拉已同意恢復(fù)外交和領(lǐng)事關(guān)系。圖為委內(nèi)瑞拉臨時(shí)總統(tǒng)德?tīng)栁鳌ち_德里格斯（右）在委內(nèi)瑞拉首都加拉加斯米拉弗洛雷斯總統(tǒng)府，在美國(guó)內(nèi)政部長(zhǎng)道格·伯古姆（左）的陪同下簽署文件。圖源：PBS

涉及伊朗的沖突可能同樣體現(xiàn)了一種更廣泛的戰(zhàn)略冒險(xiǎn)。在針對(duì)這一重要地區(qū)對(duì)手的同時(shí)，由于其他大國(guó)直接干預(yù)的可能性較低，華盛頓似乎判斷國(guó)際地緣政治環(huán)境是允許其采取行動(dòng)的。

The conflict involving Iran may similarly represent a broader strategic gamble. By targeting a major regional adversary while the likelihood of direct intervention by other major powers remained low, Washington appears to have calculated that the geopolitical environment was permissive.

從短期來(lái)看，美國(guó)展示了其軍事投射能力與戰(zhàn)略主動(dòng)性。然而，政權(quán)更迭行動(dòng)和定點(diǎn)干預(yù)的常態(tài)化，可能對(duì)規(guī)范武力使用的國(guó)際規(guī)則穩(wěn)定性產(chǎn)生深遠(yuǎn)的影響。

In the short term, the United States has demonstrated military reach and strategic initiative. However, the normalization of regime-change operations and targeted interventions could have long-term consequences for the stability of international norms governing the use of force.

大國(guó)的“信譽(yù)鴻溝”

The Credibility Gap of Great Powers

對(duì)于許多來(lái)自“全球南方”的觀察人士而言，伊朗事件提出了一個(gè)根本性問(wèn)題：無(wú)論是西方大國(guó)還是非西方大國(guó)，是否有任何一方能夠真正成為可靠的戰(zhàn)略保護(hù)者？

For many observers across the Global South, the Iran episode raises a fundamental question: can any major power, Western or non-Western, serve as a reliable strategic protector?

這一危機(jī)表明，當(dāng)核心利益未直接受到威脅時(shí)，當(dāng)代大國(guó)越來(lái)越傾向于將自身戰(zhàn)略考量置于伙伴防御之上。因此，可以從中得出若干啟示：

The crisis suggests that contemporary great powers increasingly prioritize their own strategic calculations over the defence of partners when core interests are not directly at stake. Several lessons may therefore emerge:

首先，戰(zhàn)略自主的重要性日益凸顯。各國(guó)不能想當(dāng)然地認(rèn)為，在危機(jī)時(shí)刻，遠(yuǎn)方大國(guó)會(huì)提供可靠的安全保障。

First, strategic autonomy has become increasingly important. Countries cannot assume that distant powers will provide security guarantees in moments of crisis.

其次，戰(zhàn)略對(duì)沖很可能成為主導(dǎo)的外交策略。各國(guó)可能會(huì)日益在多個(gè)大國(guó)之間分散伙伴關(guān)系，而非依賴單一的地緣政治庇護(hù)國(guó)。

Second, strategic hedging is likely to become the dominant diplomatic strategy. States may increasingly diversify their partnerships across multiple powers rather than relying on a single geopolitical patron.

第三，中等強(qiáng)國(guó)可能通過(guò)協(xié)調(diào)區(qū)域性舉措和靈活聯(lián)盟，在國(guó)際體系中獲得更大影響力。

Third, middle powers may gain influence within the international system by coordinating regional initiatives and flexible coalitions.

走向碎片化的多極化

Toward Fragmented Multipolarity

綜合來(lái)看，這些發(fā)展表明，國(guó)際體系并未朝向穩(wěn)定的“三極結(jié)構(gòu)”演進(jìn)。相反，它更可能走向碎片化多極化——這一國(guó)際環(huán)境的特征是存在多個(gè)影響力中心、聯(lián)盟關(guān)系靈活多變，以及外交行為高度務(wù)實(shí)。

Taken together, these developments suggest that the international system is not converging toward a stable tripolar structure. Instead, it appears to be moving toward fragmented multipolarity, an environment characterized by multiple centers of influence, fluid coalitions, and pragmatic diplomacy.

在這樣的體系中，地緣政治格局不太可能固化為僵化的集團(tuán)。相反，各國(guó)將越來(lái)越傾向于根據(jù)具體利益和區(qū)域環(huán)境，追求靈活多變的伙伴關(guān)系。

In such a system, geopolitical alignments are less likely to crystallize into rigid blocs. Instead, states will increasingly pursue flexible partnerships tailored to specific interests and regional contexts.

戰(zhàn)略極簡(jiǎn)主義與地緣政治庇護(hù)模式的衰落

Strategic Minimalism and the Decline of Geopolitical Patronage

因此，國(guó)際體系可能正進(jìn)入一個(gè)新階段，在這一階段，大國(guó)力圖維持影響力，同時(shí)盡量減少直接的安全承諾。這一新興格局可被稱為“戰(zhàn)略極簡(jiǎn)主義”（strategic minimalism）。

The international system may therefore be entering a new phase in which major powers seek to preserve influence while minimizing direct security commitments. This emerging pattern can be described as strategic minimalism.

在冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期，全球政治格局建立在相對(duì)清晰的地緣政治庇護(hù)體系之上。美國(guó)和蘇聯(lián)維持著由盟友和附屬國(guó)組成的網(wǎng)絡(luò)，這些國(guó)家通過(guò)正式的安全保障、軍事援助和經(jīng)濟(jì)支持獲得維護(hù)。

During the Cold War, global politics was structured around relatively clear systems of geopolitical patronage. The United States and the Soviet Union maintained networks of allies and client states supported through formal security guarantees, military assistance, and economic aid.

然而，如今的大國(guó)似乎越來(lái)越不愿承擔(dān)此類承諾所帶來(lái)的成本與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。相反，它們往往通過(guò)經(jīng)濟(jì)合作、外交參與以及選擇性干預(yù)來(lái)謀求影響力。

Today, however, major powers appear increasingly reluctant to assume the costs and risks associated with such commitments. Instead, they often seek influence through economic partnerships, diplomatic engagement, and selective intervention.

這種轉(zhuǎn)變并不意味著大國(guó)的脫離。大國(guó)仍深度參與全球事務(wù)，但其參與方式日益表現(xiàn)為經(jīng)過(guò)精確權(quán)衡的影響力施展，而非無(wú)條件的保護(hù)。

This transformation does not imply disengagement. Great powers remain deeply involved in global affairs, but their engagement increasingly takes the form of calibrated influence rather than unconditional protection.

對(duì)于許多國(guó)家——尤其是那些不屬于正式聯(lián)盟體系的國(guó)家——這種轉(zhuǎn)變可能意味著需要更加重視自力更生、區(qū)域合作以及多元化伙伴關(guān)系。

For many states-particularly those outside formal alliance structures-this shift may require greater emphasis on self-reliance, regional cooperation, and diversified partnerships.

結(jié)論

Conclusion

伊朗危機(jī)的重要性，或許并不在于其即時(shí)的軍事或外交后果，而在于它向更廣泛的國(guó)際社會(huì)傳遞的戰(zhàn)略啟示。

The Iran crisis may ultimately prove less important for its immediate military or diplomatic consequences than for the strategic lessons it conveys to the broader international community.

對(duì)于全球南方的許多國(guó)家以及新興中等強(qiáng)國(guó)而言，這一事件凸顯了在日益碎片化的國(guó)際體系中，大國(guó)庇護(hù)的局限性。與大國(guó)建立伙伴關(guān)系雖然可能帶來(lái)經(jīng)濟(jì)機(jī)會(huì)和外交支持，但并不必然轉(zhuǎn)化為可靠的安全保障。

For many countries across the Global South and among emerging middle powers, the episode highlights the limits of great-power patronage in an increasingly fragmented international system. Partnerships with major powers may offer economic opportunities and diplomatic support, but they do not necessarily translate into reliable security guarantees.

如果這種認(rèn)知在更大范圍內(nèi)擴(kuò)散開(kāi)來(lái)，伊朗危機(jī)的持久影響可能不在于沖突本身，而在于全球主要大國(guó)試圖培育的地緣政治聯(lián)盟逐漸瓦解。

If this perception spreads, the lasting legacy of the Iran crisis may not be the conflict itself but the gradual erosion of the geopolitical coalitions that the world’s major powers have sought to cultivate.

IPP公共關(guān)系與傳播中心

審校 | 劉 深

排版 | 周浩鍇

終審 | 劉金程

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